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Abstract
The introduction of pentavalent vaccine containing Haemophilus influenzae type b antigen in
Indonesia’s National Immunization Program occurred nearly three decades after the vaccine was
first available in the United States and 16 years after Indonesia added hepatitis B vaccine into the
program. In this study, we analyzed the process that led to the decision to introduce pentavalent
vaccine in Indonesia. Using process tracing and case comparison, we used qualitative data gath-
ered through interviews with key informants and data extracted from written sources to identify
four distinct but interrelated processes that were involved in the decision making: (a) pentavalent
vaccine use policy process, (b) financing process, (c) domestic vaccine development process and
(d) political process. We hypothesized that each process is associated with four necessary condi-
tions that are jointly sufficient for the successful introduction of pentavalent vaccine in Indonesia,
namely (a) an evidence-based vaccine use recommendation, (b) sufficient domestic financing cap-
acity, (c) sufficient domestic vaccine manufacturing capacity and (d) political support for introduc-
tion. This analysis of four processes that led to the decision to introduce a new vaccine in
Indonesia may help policy makers and other stakeholders understand and manage activities that
can accelerate vaccine introduction in the future.
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Introduction
The introduction of new vaccines in lower income countries usually
lags behind that in higher income countries. Previous studies have
demonstrated factors that are associated with a higher probability of
accelerated introduction. For example, higher probability of intro-
duction correlates with country per-capita gross domestic product,
vaccine cost, immunization program strength, disease burden, dis-
ease treatment cost, access to external funding and the political and
institutional capacity to decide and implement the introduction
(Gauri and Khalegian 2002, Miller and Flanders 2000). Accelerated
introduction of Haemophilus influenzae type b (Hib) vaccine was
correlated with democratic institutions, introduction by neighboring
Key Messages
• The decision to introduce a new vaccine is a complex process that often deviates from guidelines and generalizations,
therefore country-specific knowledge of the process is required to enhance the possibility of future new vaccine
introduction.
• Evidence building, financing, vaccine manufacturing and politics are separate but interdependent processes that lead to
the decision to introduce a new vaccine.
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countries and eligibility for funding from Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance
(Gavi) formerly the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization,
whereas an increase in vaccine price, financing uncertainty, and
being situated in East Asia, Pacific, Europe and Central Asia contrib-
uted to delayed introduction (Shearer et al. 2010).
Although frameworks to assist decision makers for introducing
new vaccines are available (Burchett et al. 2012b; Erickson et al.
2005; World Health Organization 2014b), there are evidence that
the decision making process in practice is more complex and does
not always follow these guidelines (Burchett et al. 2012a; de
Oliveira et al. 2013). A more thorough within country assessment
can highlight the complex and diverse process of new vaccine intro-
duction across countries. For example, domestic vaccine production
was an important driver for the introduction of hepatitis B vaccine
in Taiwan but not in Thailand, whereas vaccine price was important
in Thailand but not in Taiwan (Munira and Fritzen 2007).
Understanding the processes and drivers of the introduction of new
vaccines within countries is important for accelerating future intro-
ductions (Gauri and Khalegian 2002; Munira and Fritzen 2007).
Indonesia introduced Hib-containing pentavalent vaccine in its
National Immunization Program (NIP) in 2013, 16 years after intro-
ducing hepatitis B vaccine in 1997 (Yulitasari 2014). As described
elsewhere (Mahoney 2004; Muraskin 1995), the introduction of
hepatitis B vaccine was highly influenced by the involvement of the
International Task Force on Hepatitis B Immunization. The Task
Force’s vaccine introduction model demonstrated that success was
attributable to strong high-level political support, development of
appropriate delivery policies through large-scale demonstration pro-
ject, availability of adequate supply of affordable vaccine, and sus-
tainable financing. The model was successfully replicated in several
other countries and led to the integration of Hepatitis B vaccine in
the Expanded Program for Immunization and a push to establish a
global fund for its financing.
In the intervening period between the two vaccine introductions,
major political reforms occurred in Indonesia following the 1998
economic crisis—including the transition from an authoritarian re-
gime to a democratic state, an increase in local government auton-
omy, and a move to decentralize the health system. Hence, the
introduction of the pentavalent vaccine in 2013 offers an opportun-
ity to examine the current process of vaccine introduction in
Indonesia in this new political context.
This study explores the process through which the decision to
introduce the pentavalent vaccine in Indonesia was made. We sup-
plemented the pentavalent vaccine introduction case with other
cases where new vaccines were proposed to be introduced to postu-
late hypotheses of necessary and sufficient conditions for successful
vaccine introduction. Findings from this study may help policy mak-
ers focus on those factors that may accelerate future vaccine intro-
duction in Indonesia.
Methods
We used process tracing to explore the processes and conditions
leading to successful vaccine introduction in the cases of pentavalent
and other vaccines in Indonesia. We sought to identify whether the
presence of certain conditions was necessary and sufficient for a suc-
cessful introduction.
Case study selection
Following WHO, we defined new vaccine introduction as the add-
ition of a new vaccine or vaccine formulation into the national im-
munization program (World Health Organization 2014b). As such,
the pentavalent introduction was identified as the only successful
case in Indonesia in recent years. Additionally, we identified plans
and processes to introduce Japanese encephalitis B (JE), the pan-
demic H1N1 flu, rotavirus and inactivated poliovirus (IPV) vaccines
that did not or had not yet resulted in successful introduction.
Data collection
We conducted in-depth interviews between June and October of
2013 with 13 individuals knowledgeable about the process of penta-
valent vaccine introduction in Indonesia, selected based on their
relevant positions in organizations known to have influenced the
process (Richards 1996). An interview guide was used and included
questions exploring the process of vaccine introduction, actors and
organizations that were involved in the process, and contexts con-
sidered to be important or influential throughout the process.
Interviews took on average 60 minutes, were conducted in
English or Bahasa Indonesia, and were transcribed from the record-
ings or, in cases where interviewees denied recording, from inter-
view notes. All interviews were conducted by first author. Written
documentation, such as regulations, presentations made by relevant
officials, newspaper articles and peer-reviewed papers were also ob-
tained to corroborate and complement claims made during the
interviews.
Analysis
Interview transcripts were used as our main data source to identify
the intervening processes that resulted in the introduction of the
pentavalent vaccine (Tansey 2007). We systematically identified fac-
tors that potentially determined the outcome of pentavalent and
other vaccine introduction in Indonesia by following a policy ana-
lysis framework (Buse et al. 2005; Walt and Gilson 1994).
Specifically, we used this policy analysis framework in a thematic
analysis to predefined categories (Table 1) into which specific codes
emerged from the interview transcripts and written sources would
be assigned (Gale et al. 2013). We subsequently identified and
organized sufficiently distinct information within each category as
subcategories (Buse et al. 2005), and pieced together the vaccine
introduction decision making process and preconditions by applying
process tracing (George and Bennett 2005). Finally, we constructed
hypotheses of necessary conditions using available information from
other vaccine introduction plans (Goertz and Levy 2007). Coding of
the interview transcripts and written documentations were done in
OpenCode 4.02 (ICT Services and System Development and
Division of Epidemiology and Global Health 2013).
Table 1. Operational definition of coding categories
Coding category Definition
Policy content Policy’s substance, i.e. introduction of new vaccines
into Indonesia’s national immunization program
Policy actors Individuals or organizations, domestic or interna-
tional, who influence the policy process
Policy process The course of action from the initiation to imple-
mentation of a policy
Political process The interaction characterized by negotiation and
conflicts among actors during the policy process,
or process resulted from the prevailing political
system
Policy context Variables that influence the policy process but reside
outside of the policy process itself
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Results
Interviewees consisted of former and current mid-to-top level offi-
cials from the WHO, Program for Appropriate Technology in
Health (PATH), and the Indonesian Ministry of Health, as well as
from the Indonesian Technical Advisory Group on Immunization
(ITAGI), Indonesian House of Representatives and PT Bio Farma
(Table 2). An official from UNICEF Indonesia was invited but was
unable to participate because of conflicting schedule. An invitation
was sent to a private vaccine manufacturer representative office in
Jakarta, but no response was received.
We identified four separate but interdependent processes occur-
ring between 1998 and 2013 that affected the decision to introduc-
tion the vaccine. Those processes were: the pentavalent vaccine use
policy, vaccine financing, domestic vaccine production and political
processes (Table 3).
Pentavalent vaccine use policy process
The first process involved an official government recommendation
to use the new vaccine. The formal process to include the pentava-
lent vaccine in the NIP began in 2007 with a recommendation from
the newly established ITAGI for its use in the NIP (Hadinegoro et al.
2011). This took place one year after WHO revised its recommenda-
tion to introduce Hib vaccine globally regardless of demonstrated
disease burden (World Health Organization 2006). Prior to this re-
vision, WHO recommended the introduction of Hib vaccines for the
prevention of pneumonia and meningitis among children under-5
years of age (World Health Organization 1998), focusing on coun-
tries with demonstrated disease burden. However, local evidence of
Hib disease burden was not demonstrated until a vaccine-probe
randomized control trial in Lombok, Indonesia, was concluded in
2002 (Gessner et al. 2005). The 1998 WHO recommendation was
followed by the Indonesian Pediatric Society that included Hib vac-
cine in their immunization schedule (Indonesian Pediatric Society
Task Force on Immunization 2000), but the government did not yet
issue any specific consideration about its use in the NIP.
Taking into account cold chain capacity and vaccine wastage,
ITAGI’s recommendation was updated in 2008 with a suggestion to
produce the vaccine domestically as a liquid pentavalent vaccine,
and was updated twice in 2010 adding recommendations for im-
munization scheduling (Indonesian Technical Advisory Group on
Immunization 2010). In the same year, the Ministry of Health
included the plan to introduce pentavalent vaccine in 2013 in its
Comprehensive Multi-Year Plan (CMYP) for years 2010–2014.The
Ministry of Health passed a ministerial decree in June 2013 to intro-
duce the pentavalent vaccine. Taking into account PT Bio Farma’s
capacity to produce the vaccine in sufficient amount and the pre-
paredness of the NIP to deliver the new vaccine, the new NIP was
rolled out in four provinces in August 2013 and planned to be ex-
panded to cover all 34 provinces within a 1-year period.
Pentavalent vaccine financing process
The second process involved assured financing for the new vaccine.
Pentavalent vaccine introduction in Indonesia was supported by
Gavi. The request for Gavi funding was proposed in 2011 and was
approved in 2013, with Gavi cofinancing amounts for the years
2013–2016 of (in million US$) 9.2, 12.7, 21.4 and 7.8, respectively,
whereas the Indonesian government contributions for the same years
were proposed to be (in million US$) 1.9, 9.9, 19.8 and 28.3, re-
spectively. According to one interviewee, the government capacity
to finance vaccine introduction at the time was insufficient so that it
required a higher Gavi contribution and a partial reallocation of the
government’s fuel subsidy to make the introduction possible
(Interviewee-13 [I-13]), and that otherwise the introduction would
not have occurred (I-2).
Funding for routine immunization programs came from
Indonesia’s annual national budget such that the availability of gov-
ernment financing funds was also subjected to the government’s
budgeting process (I-13). The proposed pentavalent introduction
financing had to be approved within the Ministry of Health, and
then by the National Development Planning Bureau and be sub-
jected to negotiation with the Ministry of Finance before finally
being discussed with the parliament and passed as a bill (Ministry of
Table 2. Interviewees and institutions represented
Institution Number of
interviewees
Consideration
Sub-Directorate of Immunization—The
Ministry of Health (MoH)
2 Responsible for the design and operation of national immunization pro-
gram in Indonesia
World Health Organization, Indonesia 2 Indonesia’s NIP largely followed WHO recommendations. WHO provides
technical support for the Ministry of Health
PT Bio Farma 2 A government-owned vaccine manufacturer that supplied all vaccines used
in the NIP
The Indonesian Technical Advisory
Group on Immunization
1 The national immunization technical advisory group for Indonesia, man-
dated to provide vaccine-related advice to the Ministry of Health
The People’s Representative Council
(parliament)
1 Parliament’s approval is needed for vaccine introduction budget
Provincial level health office—West Java
Province
1 Provincial and city/district level health office, as an organ of local govern-
ments, were responsible to fund the operational costs of immunization
program. In addition, local government can also recommend their own
vaccination practices in addition to the NIP
City level health office—city of
Bandung, West Java
2 Same as above
Independent consultants 2 The individuals had worked with PATH in Indonesia and had extensive
experience with Hep B and Hib pilot projects
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Finance of the Republic of Indonesia 2014). Additionally, provincial
and district level governments had to contribute to finance the oper-
ational cost of the immunization program (Health Minister of
Republic of Indonesia Decree 2013a). However, because the penta-
valent vaccine only added an antigen to the tetravalent vaccine al-
ready included in the NIP, it did not impose additional operational
costs to local governments.
In addition to the availability of funding for introducing a new vac-
cine, the Ministry of Health considered sustainability of funding to be
an important consideration prior to making a decision to introduce a
new vaccine (I-4). Even though the Ministry of Health had allocated
immunization program financing within a routine expenditure cat-
egory, which in theory would guarantee funding availability, the pro-
gram had experienced funding cuts. Sustainability of the immunization
program was considered important to maintain public trust and hence
the continued successful delivery of immunization services.
Pentavalent vaccine domestic production process
The third process addressed the existence of a domestic producer for
the new vaccine. PT Bio Farma is a government-owned company
and is the only local vaccine manufacturer in Indonesia. PT Bio
Farma’s technical capacity to manufacture Hib vaccine, initially in
freeze-dried preparation, was obtained through a technology trans-
fer agreement started in 1998 with the National Institute for Public
Health and the Environment, from the Netherlands (Beurret et al.
2012). In response to ITAGI’s recommendation, however, PT Bio
Farma initiated a new technology transfer to produce liquid, Hib-
containing, pentavalent vaccine in five-dose vials. Clinical trials
were completed in 2012 and soon after the vaccine received the na-
tional regulatory authority’s approval for use. PT Bio Farma’s
pentavalent production capacity was sufficient to fulfill 20% of the
national demand in 2013, and 100% in 2014 (Politik Indonesia
2012). One interviewee considered the lengthy process for acquiring
the capability to produce the vaccine as one of the key rate limiting
factors for introducing the pentavalent vaccine (I-6); but once PT
Bio Farma was able to produce the vaccine there was a need to pur-
chase and use the product (I-4).
Political process
The fourth process involved political discussion and actions within
government bodies. The political process of pentavalent vaccine
introduction was embedded within the existing technical and bur-
eaucratic processes inside the Ministry of Health and between the
Ministry of Health and other stakeholders. Within the Ministry of
Health, the immunization program had to compete with other pri-
orities and eventually would need to gain support from the Health
Minister (I-4). The importance of the Minister’s political ideology
in shaping the official decision is best illustrated by way of an ex-
ample. During the H5N1 avian flu outbreak, 2005–2009, the then–
Health Minister of Indonesia used anti-Western sentiment in the
country with the largest Muslim population in the world (Lakoff
2010) and introduced the concept of ‘viral sovereignty’ that pre-
vented Indonesia from sharing its circulating strain of H5N1 with
the global health community (Supari 2008). The rejection of JE vac-
cine use, described later in this article, also occurred within the
same Ministry of Health leadership for allegedly similar anti-for-
eign sentiment (I-2, I-3). By contrast, her successor, a Harvard
graduate and accomplished researcher at the Ministry of Health,
was described as more open to global collaboration (Sciortino
2012).
The Indonesian parliament also played an important political
role in the review of government budgets, especially with its author-
ity to examine the proposed ministry’s budget line-by-line in the in-
depth review process, during which it was not uncommon for the
parliament to deny or postpone the approval of a budget line (I-2, I-
5, I-13). In addition, health system decentralization that occurred in
Indonesia since 2001 was acknowledged to have weakened
Indonesia’s immunization program (Directorate General for Disease
Control and Environmental Health 2011).
Advocacy was considered important to secure political support
from the parliament through regular consultation meetings between
the Ministry of Health and the parliament (I-2). In addition to the
Ministry of Health, WHO also played a role in advocating pentava-
lent vaccine introduction. Two parliament members were sent to
join a group of policy makers in the Sabin Vaccine Institute’s
Sustainable Immunization Financing Program in Senegal, August 5-
6, 2013, to learn about positive experiences with pentavalent vac-
cine introduction in other countries. This had a positive impact on
generating political support for pentavalent introduction in
Indonesia (Berita Satu Online 2013). Of note, the issue of pentava-
lent vaccine introduction seemed to have circulated within a closed
network of policy makers, unlike the ongoing immunization pro-
gram that could produce a wide public discussion and to some
Table 3. Key events leading to pentavalent introduction in Indonesia
Year Policy process Financing process Vaccine production process
1998 First WHO recommendation Technology transfer agreement between PT Bio Farma
and the NetherlandsLombok Hib study commenced
2002 Hib clinical lot produced by PT Bio Farma
2003 Clinical trials started
2005 Lombok study results published
2006 Second WHO recommendation
2007 First ITAGI recommendation
2008 Second ITAGI recommendation Liquid pentavalent vaccine production started
2010 Third ITAGI recommendation
Introduction planned in CMYP
2010–2014
2011 GAVI application
2012 GAVI approval Clinical trials ended
Central budget approval
2013 Health Minister’s decree PT Bio Farma pentavalent vaccine PentaBIOTM received
approval from Indonesia’s Food and Drug
Administration agency
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extent rejection, especially with regard to possible use of certain por-
cine elements that would make the vaccine impermissible by Islamic
law. Regardless, the Ministry of Health and PT Bio Farma acted
cautiously and were in close consultation with the Council of
Indonesian Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia) to assure support from
the largest ulama representation body in Indonesia (I-4, I-10, I-13).
The view that a domestically manufactured vaccine was neces-
sary for the introduction was expressed strongly by two of the inter-
viewees (I-3, I-4). Procuring vaccines from PT Bio Farma provided
economic advantages compared to importing vaccines (I-13), such
that purchasing vaccines from PT Bio Farma was considered as a
good investment and would prevent national reserves from going
abroad (I-8, I-9). This view is in line with Indonesia’s commitment
to achieving self-sufficiency not only for vaccine production but also
in economic development in a more general sense.
Processes observed with other vaccines
We briefly looked at four cases of unsuccessful vaccine introduction
in Indonesia, to see the role of the four processes described above.
Japanese encephalitis vaccine
Although Japanese encephalitis infections have been identified in
Indonesia since 1972, evidence supporting a new vaccination policy
was not available until results of a 2-year hospital-based surveillance
in Bali were published in April of 2006 (Kari et al. 2006).
Presentation of the evidence in a meeting organized by the
International Vaccine Institute in September 2006 resulted in a
strong support by the Ministry of Health to introduce JE vaccine in
Bali as soon as possible. Subsequently, an action plan for routine
and catch-up vaccination of Balinese children using live attenuated
vaccine from China was developed in February 2007 (International
Vaccine Institute 2007). ITAGI followed up with a recommendation
on the use of JE vaccine in a pilot study in Bali in 2008 (Hadinegoro
et al. 2011). A Chinese JE vaccine available at a very low cost
(approximately US$0.20/dose) was planned to be used in Indonesia
through PATH’s JE Program (International Vaccine Institute 2009).
However, the introduction plan was reportedly rejected by the
Health Minister, because the minister did not want to use an im-
ported vaccine in the NIP (I-3).
The case demonstrated the failure to introduce a new vaccine
due to the absence of several necessary conditions, mainly political
support. In the presence of evidence supporting the use of JE vac-
cine, we argue that this lack of support stemmed from the lack of
domestic production capacity. Financing process, on the other hand,
was not initiated or was terminated very early as a result of the polit-
ical decision not to introduce the vaccine.
Influenza pandemic vaccine
WHO declared H1N1 influenza a pandemic in June 2009 and called
for the full use of global influenza vaccine production capacity to
produce the pandemic vaccine (Chan 2009). Shortly thereafter
WHO called for assistance for least-developed countries to cope
with the pandemic, resulting in a total of 122.5 million doses of
donated vaccine globally (World Health Organization 2012).
Although Indonesia was eligible to receive WHO donated pandemic
vaccine, Indonesia did not make the request (World Health
Organization 2011). Local news media reported that the parliament
urged the Ministry of Health to refuse the donation because of the
possibility of virus strain mismatch (Republika Online 2010).
Meanwhile, the Ministry of Health was concerned that the short-
term nature of pandemic vaccine delivery would create mistrust for
the nation’s entire immunization program, once the influenza pro-
gram was discontinued (I-4).
Similar to JE introduction, this case demonstrates the necessity
of having political support to introduce a new vaccine and under-
lines the involvement of the parliament in the process. Arguably, evi-
dence of a pandemic should have sufficed to support the local use of
H1N1 pandemic vaccine, in spite of the parliament’s concern.
Further, as the vaccines were donated, a large part of funding for the
program should have been addressed. It is not unlikely that the par-
liament’s objection was politically motivated and may have resulted
from (as well as reinforced by) the Ministry of Health’s main con-
cern, i.e. the lack of guaranteed supply of vaccine due to the unavail-
ability of locally produced vaccine.
Rotavirus vaccine
Rotavirus infection had been demonstrated to account for 60% of
hospitalized childhood diarrhea cases in Indonesia (Soenarto et al.
1981). Physicians from Gadjah Mada University in Indonesia had
been studying rotavirus infection in children since late 1970s and
were actively engaged to accelerate the introduction of rotavirus
vaccine in Indonesia. In 2013, they started the manufacturing pro-
cess of a low cost rotavirus vaccine at PT Bio Farma in collaboration
with Murdoch Children’s Research Institute in Australia (Murdoch
Childrens Research Institute 2013). Domestically produced vaccine
was considered necessary to reduce costs and therefore increase the
possibility of introduction (I-1). PT Bio Farma’s rotavirus vaccine is
estimated to be ready in 2016 (Antaranews\.Com 2011), which
could then result in the decision to introduce the new vaccine into
Indonesia’s NIP.
In this case, the introduction of rotavirus vaccine was still very
early in its process. Although very limited information was available
regarding the process, the presence of avid advocates who were
keeping the process moving was readily observable. It could be
argued that the process thus far—from research to technology trans-
fer—was taken based on insights that having PT Bio Farma produce
the vaccine would increase the likelihood of getting other processes,
politics and financing, moving toward supporting rotavirus vaccine
introduction.
Polio IPV
In 2002, WHO offered Indonesia the opportunity to conduct a study
to evaluate the possibility of switching to inactivated polio vaccine
from oral polio vaccine that had been used in Indonesia’s NIP since
1982 (Gendrowahyuhono et al. 2010). Switching to IPV was sug-
gested as part of the global polio eradication strategy by WHO to
maintain a high level of population immunity against polio in light
of possible circulating vaccine derived polio viruses from the oral
form. Following a recommendation from the Indonesian acute flac-
cid paralysis expert group, a pilot study was conducted in the city of
Yogyakarta starting from year 2007 and was planned to be finished
in 2011 using an imported vaccine. Funding for the pilot came
mostly from WHO (Health Minister of Republic of Indonesia
Decree 2007). At about the same time, in 2007, PT Bio Farma
started a technology transfer process for IPV production with the
Japanese government (Gendrowahyuhono et al. 2010) and was ex-
pected to be ready to produce its own IPV by 2016 (Pt Bio Farma
2012). Because of favorable results from the switch, the Ministry of
Health decided to continue the use of IPV in Yogyakarta beyond the
pilot study using the imported vaccine, financed from the central
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and local government budget (Health Minister of Republic of
Indonesia Decree 2013b).
Unlike the other cases above, the polio IPV immunization pro-
gram was using imported vaccine financed by the government.
However, this case is different from the other cases, in that the IPV
immunization program was a pilot conducted in one province. This
case shows that the government could agree on introducing an im-
ported vaccine in a certain program.
Hypothesized conditions for successful vaccine
introduction in Indonesia
We hypothesize that the processes described above are associated
with certain conditions that are necessary for new vaccine introduc-
tion in Indonesia.
Hypothesis #1: an official evidence-based
recommendation is a necessary condition for
introduction
By the addition of Hib, the Indonesian NIP has included 8 of the 12
antigens recommended by WHO for routine immunization in all
countries. The included ones are the BCG, DPT-Hepatitis B-Hib,
polio and measles vaccines, while the remaining four are rotavirus,
pneumococcal, rubella and HPV vaccines. The Ministry of Health
included in its 2010–2014 Comprehensive Multi-Year Plan the plan
to introduce or to prepare for the introduction of JE, pneumococcal
and typhoid vaccines and to have ITAGI actively review evidence to
introduce rotavirus and influenza vaccines (Directorate General for
Disease Control and Environmental Health 2011). So far, vaccines
outside of WHO recommendations have never been introduced in
the NIP. However, even though WHO recommendations have been
the starting point of new vaccine introduction in Indonesia, avail-
ability of some supporting evidence of local disease burden and vac-
cine cost-effectiveness are necessary prior to introduction. This can
be demonstrated by the Lombok study prior to Hib vaccine intro-
duction, and studies being done in preparation for the introduction
of other vaccines such as JE surveillance study in Bali, and studies
for supporting the use of rotavirus and IPV vaccines. Local evidence
is necessary for policy makers to design appropriate vaccination
scheduling and targeting and more importantly to justify new vac-
cine introduction amidst competing priorities. Evidence from neigh-
boring countries or from countries with similar characteristics to
Indonesia does not suffice to justify new vaccine introduction, as
demonstrated by the case of pandemic flu vaccine introduction. In
this case, even though it was evident that the novel H1N1 flu virus
was circulating worldwide, the vaccine was rejected because of the
absence of local evidence supporting its use. In addition, this recom-
mendation includes other considerations such as cold chain cap-
acity, preferred vaccine presentation, and vaccination schedule.
Hypothesis #2: Sufficient domestic financing to pay for
the delivery of a new vaccine is a necessary condition
for introduction
At full scale, the introduction of pentavalent vaccine into
Indonesia’s NIP requires an additional US$30 million in annual NIP
financing, or a 15% increase from the pre-introduction budget.
Even though the immunization program budget is allocated in the
Ministry of Health’s routine spending budget (I-5), funding cuts had
happened and the immunization program had experienced vaccine
shortage due to lack of funding (I-4). Unlike the ongoing
immunization program, however, there is no guarantee that funding
will be made available for introducing new vaccines.
It is evident that Indonesia had problems allocating sufficient
funding for the introduction of pentavalent vaccine and it would not
have happened without Gavi support and the serendipitous avail-
ability of funding from Indonesia’s gas subsidy cut. The increase in
global gasoline prices that occurred at the time forced the govern-
ment to gradually reduce the gas subsidy and reallocate the funding
to social programs, among others to finance pentavalent vaccine
introduction. Although immunization program financing can come
from both domestic and donor funding sources (Health Minister of
Republic of Indonesia Decree 2013a), Indonesia has been self-
financing its routine immunization program. Traditionally, more
than 50% of NIP financing comes from the central government
budget, about 40% came from provincial and district government
budget and less than 10% comes from external sourcing like Gavi
(Directorate General for Disease Control and Environmental Health
2011). Even though Gavi’s co-financing was critical for the intro-
duction of the pentavalent vaccine, domestic funding sources were
required by Gavi and needed to continue beyond the 4 year Gavi co-
financing agreement. Moreover, as Indonesia’s economic condition
has improved, it is graduating from Gavi and will not be eligible for
future funding to support new vaccine introduction. Hence, al-
though alternative external funding sources can be available for fu-
ture vaccine introduction, it is probably a good idea to ensure that
domestic funding sources will be available and not to rely on exter-
nal funding sources, as it is generally very hard for countries like
Indonesia to project and predict their availability (McQuestion et al.
2011).
Hypothesis #3: Demonstrating national production
capacity for a new vaccine is a necessary condition for
introduction
For Indonesia, the ability of PT Bio Farma to produce the vaccine of
interest is necessary for introduction. To date, every vaccine used in
Indonesia’s NIP is manufactured by PT Bio Farma, whose ‘commit-
ment was to develop national vaccine industry’s independence, such
that the government is not required to import vaccines to fulfill na-
tional needs’ (Bachtiar and Nurlaela 2014). The attempts to intro-
duce the H1N1 and JE vaccines illustrate how the lack of national
production capacity for vaccines can prevent introduction. Further,
even though available evidence supported the use of rotavirus vac-
cine in Indonesia, there was no plan to introduce the rotavirus vac-
cine into the NIP by using an imported vaccine and instead a
technology transfer program was initiated to prepare for the
introduction.
The push to use nationally produced vaccines in the NIP can be
traced back to post-colonial Indonesia. Dr. Sardjito, the first
Indonesian to head PT Bio Farma in the post-independence era
(1945 – 1946), already aimed at self-sufficiency in vaccines against
measles and cholera as one of the ways to achieve President
Soekarno’s economic ideology of berdikari (acronym from berdiri di
atas kaki sendiri, or ‘standing on its own two feet’) (Neelakantan
2015). In the late 1970s, Indonesia opposed Singapore’s intention to
take on the role as ASEAN’s Hepatitis B vaccine production center,
fearing that this plan would undermine Indonesia’s aim to be vac-
cine self-sufficient (Anwar 1994). More recently, PT Bio Farma es-
tablished a National Vaccine Research Forum comprised of
academic researchers, the government, and PT Bio Farma itself. The
Forum drafted a vaccine research roadmap with vaccine self-
sufficiency as one of its core goals (The Jakarta Post 2011). Hence,
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even though an imported vaccine was used in the IPV vaccination
program in Yogyakarta, it is very likely that IPV use will not be ex-
panded in the NIP until PT Bio Farma is ready to fulfill the need.
Hypothesis #4: Political support is a necessary
condition for new vaccine introduction
The failures to introduce the pandemic flu and JE vaccines provide
two examples of political obstacles to new vaccine introduction in
Indonesia, resulting from actions taken by the parliament and by the
Health Minister, respectively. Indonesia’s past experience with
hepatitis B vaccine also demonstrates the importance of political
support for vaccine introduction (Mahoney 2004; Muraskin 1995).
The death of a close friend of President Soeharto due to liver cancer
was an important factor in his decision to push for the addition of
hepatitis B vaccine to the NIP and its early expansion to cover the
whole country.
Considering that vaccination is one of the most cost-effective,
life-saving public health interventions available, introducing a new
vaccine that has sufficient evidence about effectiveness and safety
should receive support from rational decision makers. The two cases
of the JE vaccine and pandemic flu vaccine, however, demonstrate
that political motives such as economic sovereignty and nationalism
can influence the decision to introduce a new vaccine. Arguably, de-
cision makers involved in new vaccine introduction can have differ-
ent motives and the end result will depend on whether a consensus
could be reached. While decision to introduce and accelerate the use
of a new vaccine in the past could be made by an authoritative figure
such as former President Soeharto, such a figure may not exist in a
democratized, decentralized and multi-party system, as in Indonesia
today (Aspinall and Fealy 2003). In the case of the pentavalent vac-
cine, the decision to introduce this new vaccine gained needed polit-
ical support because potential opposition was probably eliminated,
or at least reduced, by the appointment of a new health minister
and/or by the fact that a domestically produced vaccine was going
to be used.
Hypothesis #5: the four conditions are jointly sufficient
for introduction
Finally, we hypothesize that the decision to introduce a new vaccine
will occur if all four aforementioned conditions were simultaneously
present. The case of the pentavalent vaccine introduction supports
this hypothesis. Following vaccine availability, the first condition to
be met was the issuance of recommendations by the WHO and
ITAGI, supported by evidence from Lombok. Domestic production
of vaccine was initiated about the same time, although a domestic
vaccine product was not available for use until just before the intro-
duction. In the meantime, the Ministry of Health maintained polit-
ical support from within its own organization and with outside
political bodies, and secured funding from both the government and
donor. By contrast, the absence of one or more of these necessary
conditions was observed in the failed attempts to introduce the JE,
rotavirus and H1N1 vaccines in Indonesia.
Discussion
In this study, we utilized the case of pentavalent vaccine as an ex-
ample of a successful new vaccine introduction in Indonesia, and we
analyzed the processes that led to the decision to introduce the vac-
cine. Our analysis of key actor interviews and written sources dem-
onstrates that the decision making process for introducing a new
vaccine in Indonesia involves four separate but interdependent
processes, namely, new vaccine use policy, financing, national pro-
duction and political processes. Further, using information from
other vaccine introduction attempts, we postulate that these proc-
esses are associated with four necessary conditions for introduction,
namely, an evidence-based recommendation for new vaccine use,
sufficient national financing capacity, sufficient domestic vaccine
production and political support for introduction. We further hy-
pothesize that the presence of all four necessary conditions is suffi-
cient for successful introduction of a new vaccine.
Previous studies have demonstrated the complexity of the pro-
cess leading to successful new vaccine introduction, with similarities
and differences between countries (Burchett et al. 2012a; Chen
2013; Gupta et al. 2012; Munira and Fritzen 2007; Udin et al.
2013). While guidelines for introducing new vaccines and multi-
country studies can provide general insights on this process, they do
not sufficiently explain this complexity. For example, WHO’s New
Vaccine Introduction guideline explains at length the importance of
considering evidence supporting the introduction of new vaccines
and the strength of the health system (World Health Organization
2014a), but neglects the importance of politics and domestic vaccine
production that we find important in our study. In addition, even
though studies employing quantitative methods such as regression
analyses are valuable to infer which factors affect the probability
and the timing of introduction, they cannot say which factors are ne-
cessary or sufficient for the introduction to occur. Our study serves
to fill these gaps, for the case of Indonesia, and provides an alterna-
tive perspective on the decision making processes to introduce a new
vaccine.
WHO recommendations and guidelines for vaccine use, based
on evidence of disease burden, vaccine characteristics, and program-
matic strength, typically inform government decisions to introduce a
new vaccine (Burchett et al. 2012a). Similarly, we found that the
Indonesian Ministry of Health regards scientific evidence as a crucial
consideration in the decision to introduce a new vaccine. In that re-
gard, WHO recommendations usually act as a prompt (Mantel and
Wang 2012) for the decision making process to be initiated, sup-
ported by domestic scientific recommendations from technical pol-
icy groups such as ITAGI (Health Minister of Republic of Indonesia
Decree 2010). However, we found no written guidelines or frame-
works that explain how the government should weigh and use this
evidence, or how ITAGI ought to aggregate and rank evidence.
ITAGI’s role is also limited to advising the Ministry of Health and
thus the recommendation may or may not be followed. Hence, while
some scientific evidence supporting the introduction of a new vac-
cine is necessary, it is not clear what kind of evidence is sufficient to
move government’s decision toward introducing a new vaccine. This
seems to be the case in general (Mantel and Wang 2012). For ex-
ample, even results from a randomized controlled trial (RCT) were
subject for debate and did not seem to accelerate introduction of
Hib vaccine in Indonesia. For a country whose 248 million people
consists of more than 300 ethnic groups inhabiting more than 900
islands it is understandable that the generalizability of locally
acquired evidence to the whole country, such as that from the
Lombok Hib study (Gessner et al. 2005), can be a subject of debate.
Arguably, the validity of RCTs can be threatened by effect modifica-
tion in different populations and availability of more supporting evi-
dence is desirable (Victora et al. 2004). It may be the case that
evidence from research studies must be supplemented by other types
of information, including implicit knowledge possessed by those
making the decision (Nutley et al. 2003).
Indonesia’s government expenditure for immunization programs
was predicted to grow from $138.8 million in 2009 to $219.6
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million in 2014, but funds from central and local governments were
expected to decrease over time (Directorate General for Disease
Control and Environmental Health 2011). Cuts in immunization
program financing may result in temporary shortages, causing tem-
porary disruption in scheduled immunization, and thus reduction in
immunization coverage that can result in an upsurge of vaccine-pre-
ventable diseases (Hinman et al. 2006). The impact of funding cuts
on immunization coverage was observed during the financial crisis
that started in 1997, when routine government health spending
dropped by 10 and 28% for the years 1997–1998 and 1998–1999,
respectively, accompanied by a 25% point decline in DPT3 immun-
ization coverage (Simms and Rowson 2003). More recently, a tem-
porary shortage of IPV vaccines during the transition from WHO to
government funding was a cause of public concern and reported in
the media (Antaranews\.Com 2013). Thus, the decision to include
national immunization program financing in the routine part of the
Ministry of Health spending budget through legislation was a move
in the right direction to sustain and stabilize the program’s delivery,
as has been shown by the experience in the Americas (Andrus et al.
2011). However, this applies only to ongoing immunizations and
does not include the cost of introducing new vaccines. Thus, the
availability of local funding for new vaccine introduction is subject
to more uncertainties.
Previous studies found that domestic vaccine production can en-
hance the possibility of vaccine introduction in Indonesia (Mahoney
2004), as well as in other vaccine producing countries (Milstien
et al. 2007). Our study further suggested that domestic vaccine pro-
duction may even be necessary before a vaccine is introduced into
the NIP. In addition to economic justifications (World Health
Organization 2014a), we found other reasons for using a nationally
produced vaccine include health system capacity support, in the
form of vaccine delivery to provinces and maintenance of cold
chain, and political reasons to reduce dependency on imported vac-
cines. Although the Ministry of Health uses imported vaccines, such
as the use of IPV vaccine for a demonstration project in Yogyakarta
and the use of meningococcal vaccine for Muslims going on pilgrim-
age to Mecca, these can be considered as special cases outside of the
routine immunization program and the use of imported vaccines
might not have occurred otherwise.
At least two issues affected the decision to use imported menin-
gococcal vaccine instead of waiting for a domestic vaccine to be pro-
duced. First, meningococcal vaccination was made obligatory by the
Saudi Arabian government for all Muslims going on Hajj pilgrim to
Mecca. With approximately 300 000 Indonesian going for Hajj
every year, public unease would occur if these pilgrims were unable
to perform the Hajj because of the government’s non-compliance
with the regulation. Secondly, the cost of the vaccine was fully borne
by the pilgrims; and the vaccine cost would be a small fraction of
the Hajj cost. In the case of IPV, the program was still at its pilot
stage. Hence, the vaccine need was much smaller than for those vac-
cines rolled out at full scale, and the pilot was considered necessary
for establishing evidence to support future use of IPV in the NIP.
It has been previously recognized that the new vaccine introduc-
tion process is a political process involving a multitude of actors
with differing power and interests (Gauri and Khalegian 2002;
Wonodi et al. 2012). In the Ministry of Health, the Sub-Directorate
of Immunization is particularly responsible for keeping the introduc-
tion process moving forward, but its role is limited to the process of
generating the policy for new vaccine use in the NIP, and the deci-
sion making process must take into account the roles and interests
of other players. In the financing process, the Ministry of Health
must work with the Ministry of Finance, the parliament and Gavi or
other donors on the final decision about funds. The capacity to do-
mestically produce a vaccine lies in PT Bio Farma, a government-
owned corporation under the supervision of the Ministry of State
Owned Enterprises.
Arguably, the health minister plays the most decisive political
role in new vaccine introduction. Even in countries where national
immunization technical advisory groups operate, the final decision
to introduce a new vaccine often becomes a political decision made
by the health minister (McQuestion et al. 2011), as also demon-
strated in the case of JE vaccine introduction in Indonesia. However,
as a political process the decision to introduce a new vaccine is
prone to interventions from other political figures or groups, espe-
cially those with substantial influence such as the International Task
Force on Hepatitis B Immunization and former President Soeharto
in the case of hepatitis B introduction (Muraskin 1995), or the par-
liament in the case of the pandemic flu vaccine introduction, and in
some cases from donor agencies (Mantel and Wang 2012). Our
study did not reveal any strong and prominent figure advocating or
opposed to the introduction of pentavalent vaccine, suggesting that
prominent advocate or policy entrepreneur is not necessary for
introduction, although its presence may be helpful to accelerate the
process.
A major limitation of our study is that it focused on only one
successful new vaccine introduction and readers are advised that gen-
eralization to other contexts must be done with caution. This is es-
pecially true for the importance of domestic vaccine production
capacity, which is non-existent in most countries, especially in
low to middle income countries. Even for countries with domestic
vaccine manufacturing capacity, its importance to the decision
to introduce a new vaccine must be viewed within the larger political
and economic contexts (Munira and Fritzen 2007). Limited infor-
mation was available on other vaccine introduction cases, so that
analyses with similar rigor to the pentavalent vaccine case
were not possible. This is likely due to recall bias because of the re-
cency of pentavalent vaccine introduction, because of the relatively
small scale of other vaccine introduction, or because the process was
terminated or incomplete. Although interviewees were individuals
highly familiar with NIP decision making process in Indonesia,
our study lacks comprehensive representation from decision makers
at regional and global levels and therefore does not capture the
roles of these contexts on Indonesia’s national decision making pro-
cess. It is also possible that the same outcome could be achieved
through processes different from those identified by our study.
In addition, the limited number of cases does not allow us to weigh
the relative importance of each condition in different contexts.
For example, in the presence of a strong political push for introduc-
tion, the relative importance of evidence may be reduced, and vice
versa.
Nonetheless, we expect that the framework developed here can
be useful to assess the progress of vaccine introduction in Indonesia
and to identify actions that can be taken to accelerate the progress
of vaccine introduction. Our findings suggest that accelerating the
introduction of new vaccines can be achieved by initiating the four
processes and ensuring that every necessary condition is met in the
shortest time possible. Fostering research studies to gather more evi-
dence supporting the use of the vaccine, facilitating early or faster
technology transfer and development, guaranteeing new vaccine
introduction funding through legislation, and identifying political
champions for vaccination program are among ways that may accel-
erate new vaccine introduction in Indonesia.
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